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Article 3

PRIORITIES IN THE LAW OF MORTGAGES*
(Continued)

IV.
ASSIGNMENTS**

A
Effect of a Conveyance of the Mortgaged Premises by
the Mortgagee.-In Maine,' under the "title" theory, the
rule seems to be that a conveyance, in one of the modes
recognized at law,2 by a mortgagee of land (where the mortgage relation is created by a common law conveyance on a
condition subsequent), who has acquired possession,' operates at law to pass the mortgagee's interest in the land to
the grantee, enabling the latter to successfully defend
against an action of ejectment brought by the mortgagor.
* Prior parts of this paper are contained in the November, 1932, and the
January, 1933, issues of the Notre Dame Lawyer.
** The first part of this discussion deals with the methods that mortgagees
have used to transfer their interests in the security relation. Some phases of the
principles in the law of assignments, such as consideration and delivery, have not
been included within the scope of this article.
1 Cf. Connor v. Whitmore, 52 Me. 185 (1863) (Writ of entry by the mortgagor against one in possession under a deed of release from an assignee of the
mortgage; in holding that the mortgagor could not maintain the action, the court
said: "The effect of this release was to pass the title of the mortgagee to the
tenant. The mortgagee in possession, by a quitclaim deed, passes all his interest
in the mortgaged premises. . . It has been repeatedly settled that the mortgagor
cannot maintain ejectment against a mortgagee in possession. The remedy of this
plaintiff, if any he have, is in equty." It did not appear as to whether the debt
was evidenced by a distinct instrument, or whether the debt had been transferred
to the defendant.).
2 Where the courts have adverted to the character of the conveyance, in
determining its operation as transferring the mortgagee's legal interest in the land,
they have said that a deed of release is sufficient for this purpose (Connor v.
Whitmore, op. cit. supra note 1; Welch v. Priest, 8 Allen 165 (1864)), or that a
warranty deed is sufficient (Woods v. Woods, 66 Me. 206 (1877); Ruggles v.
Barton, 13 Gray 506 (1859)); or that a quitclaim deed is sufficient (Ruggles v.
Barton, supra; Hunt v. Hunt, 14 Pick. 374, 25 Am. Dec. 400 (1833)).
3 Since possession in fact is an important factor in the operation of the rule,
it would seem that a mortgagee in possession as a disseizor would have a sufficient
possession to enable him to convey his legal interest as against those adverse
claimants who cannot show a better title than that acquired by the grantee of
the mortgagee. Cf. dictum of Rugg, C. J., in Bon v. Graves, 216 Mass. 440, 103
N. E. 1023 (1914).
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But it is now well settled in Maine ' that a conveyance of
the mortgaged land by a mortgagee who has not lawfully
acquired possession of the land does not convey legal title
to the mortgaged premises, with its incidental rights, to the
grantee, unless accompanied by a transfer or assignment of
the personal security.' The reason, given by the court, is
that, until entry or foreclosure, the interest of mortgagee is
not an interest in real estate. The real security is regarded
as a chose in action; and the interest of the mortgagee in the
land, as distinguished from his title to the debt, is not assignable.
4 Wyman v. Porter, 108 Me. 110, 79 Atl. 371 (1911) (Upon writ of entry to
recover possession of certain land, the plaintiffs' title was put in issue; the
assignee of a mortgage of the locus in quo quitclaimed his interest to the plaintiffs;
there was no evidence that the mortgagee or the assignee had made entry before
the transfer, or had transferred the mortgage debt to the plaintiffs; it appeared
that it was the intention of the assignee to convey the premises themselves, and
not to assign the mortgage; held, that no legal title passed to the plaintiffs.);
Lunt v. Lunt, 71 Me. 377 (1880) (The assignee of the mortgage conveyed, by
quitclaim deed, two-ninths of the mortgaged premises to the defendant; the assignee subsequently conveyed the premises to the purchase-money mortgagor, who
paid the mortgage notes and brought a real action to recover possession of the
premises; held, that the defendant acquired no title to the two-ninths of the land,
as no entry had been made by the mortgagee under his mortgage, and there was
no assignment or transfer of the mortgage debt or any part of the same.).
In Johnson v. Leoiards, 68 Me. 237 (1878), the mortgagee, before entry to
foreclose his mortgage and without possession, gave a quitclaim deed to the defendant's predecessor of all his "right and interest" in the mortgaged premises,
but did not assign the mortgage deed or transfer the personal security; subsequently, he assigned the mortgage to the plaintiff and delivered to her the note
secured thereby. Upon writ of entry to recover possession of the premises conveyed by the quitclaim deed, it was held for the defendant, the court saying that
the mortgagee "having conveyed all his interest in the mortgaged premises . . .
by the quitclaim deed . . . had no remaining estate therein to pass to the plaintiff
by his assignment. . . ." This decision was overruled in Wyman v. Porter, supra.
5 "He who holds a note, and also a mortgage, holds in fact two instruments
for the security of the debt; first, the note with its personal security, which is
commercial paper, and, as such, may be enforced in the courts of law, with all
the rights incident to such paper; and the other, the mortgage with security on
land . . ." Per Caton, C. J., in Olds v. Cummings, 31 Ill.
188, 193 (1863).
Most mortgage contracts create two distinct securities, the mortgage debt and
the security of the land mortgaged. Thus if the mortgage is executed in the
form of a conveyance on a condition subsequent to secure a separate promissory
note or bond, the mortgagee may resort to an action on the note or bond to
enforce payment of the mortgage debt, or he may bring an action to foreclose the
mortgage. In the absence of a statute providing to the contrary, he may maintain
both actions at the same time. In order to keep these situations distinct, in this
discussion, the writer has chosen to designate the note or the bond as the "personal security," and the mortgage deed as the "real security."
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The rule that a mortgagee in possession can pass a legal
interest in the mortgaged real estate, without assigning or
transferring the debt, seems to be based upon the proposition that the mortgagee by acquiring possession acquires
more than a mere security right. He is considered as acquiring a seisin in fact-a certain interest in the land itself,
a defeasible interest, but one that he is entitled to convey.'
This reasoning is rather curious. Yet a possession in fact
acquired by a disseisor is a sufficient possession to enable
the disseisor to transfer whatever interest he has as disseisor as against one who can not show a better right to the
possession. And a tortious entry, that is, a forcible entry by
the mortgagee has been considered a sufficient possession,
under the "title" theory of mortgages in New Hampshire, to
entitle the mortgagee to take the profits of the mortgaged
premises.7 As, far as the possessory rights of a mortgagee are
concerned, it would not seem to make any difference as to
whether he has taken possession before he makes a transfer
of the mortgaged realty, or that there has been a foreclosure
by the mortgagee before he transfers the land. If the interest of a mortgagee is to be treated at law as an interest in
land by virtue of the mortgage deed, a court of law should
recognize and give complete effect to the incidental right to
possession. Where the grantee of mortgaged realty is seek6 Smith v. Booth Bros. & Hurricane Isle Granite Co., 112 Me. 297, 305, 92
Atl. 103, 107, 108 (1914). Cf. W. H. Glover Co. v. Smith, 138 Ad. 770 (Me. 1927)
(Real action, involving the right to possession of mortgaged premises; the plaintiff was the holder, through a series of mesne transfers, of the equity of redemption; an assignee of the mortgage transferred the premises, by warranty deed,
to the defendant; it did not appear that the mortgagee ever took possession of
the premises, or that the mortgage debt or any part of it was transferred to the
defendant; held, that the plaintiff was entitled to possession.). In the latter case
the court said: "It should . . . go without saying that by proper stipulation in a
mortgage the mortgagee may be given the right to assign his lien, including his
right to possession, in trust to secure the mortgage debt. But, following the
earlier cases, we hold that in the absence of such stipulation a mortgagee out of
possession cannot effectually convey his mortgage lien without also transferring
the mortgage debt."
7 See Brown v. Cram, 1 N. H. 169 (1812). Cf. Taunton v. Costar, 7 T. R.
431 (1797); Bon v. Graves, 103 N. E. 1023, 1025 (Mass. 1914).
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ing to enforce payment of the mortgage debt, without an
assignment or transfer thereof to him, the case involves quite
different considerations from those involved in a case where
the grantee is merely seeking at law to protect the possessory rights incident to the transfer of the realty to him by
the mortgagee. A recognition of these distinct situations in
"title" states should not result in any inconsistency.
It has been held in New Hampshire that a mortgagee in
actual possession is entitled, without reference to the purpose for which the possession is taken, and without regard
to the question whether anything more than mere possession will pass, to convey or transfer that possession by a
deed of the premises to another, and that the grantee is
entitled to hold it against all persons who can not show a
better title, and is entitled to -bring or defend actions in
maintenance of that possession.8 But a conveyance of the
mortgaged premises by the mortgagee, who has not acquired
possession, conveys no legal title to the property and will
not enable the grantee to successfully defend against a writ
of entry by the mortgagor to recover the possession thereof.'
8 Smith v. Smith, 15 N. H. 55 (1844) (Writ of entry brought against the
grantee of the mortgagee, who was in possession of the mortgaged premises before
the conveyance; the mortgagee had been put in possession, by virtue of a writ
of possession, before he executed his deed. The court said: "He [the mortgagee]
was then, if the notes had not been paid, a mortgagee in possession by virtue of
a process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. He had a right to retain
the possession as-against the mortgagor, and this right might be conveyed, so
that his grantee would stand in his place, and would hold whatever right of possession was owned by his grantor.").
9 Ellison v. Daniels, 11 N. H. 274 (1840) (Writ of entry by the mortgagor
to recover possession of a tract of land mortgaged by him to E; E had conveyed, by a warranty deed, to G, and G had conveyed, by a similar deed, to the
defendant. The evidence did not show that the mortgagee was in possession at
the time of the conveyance to G, or a transfer of the mortgage note to G or the
defendant. Held, the mortgagor was entitled to recover the possession.).
"... it was also settled in the latter case [Smith v. Smith, 11 N. H. 55 (1844)]
that the mere fact that the mortgagee has the right to transfer the debt to his
grantee, will not cause the deed to convey an interest in the land, unless the debt
be transferred." Per Gilchrist, J., in Weeks v. Eaton, 15 N. H. 145, 148 (1844).
"It is well settled in this state . . . that a conveyance by a mortgagee, not in
possession of the land mortgaged, will not pass the debt secured by the mortgage,
and, consequently, will not pass any interest in the land itself attempted to be
conveyed [citing cases]." Per Smith, J., in Clark v. Clark, 56 N. H. 105, 107
(1875).
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For the purpose of sale, absolute or conditional, the mortgagee is not considered as the owner of the land mortgaged,
without either foreclosure of the mortgage or entry under it.
The New Hampshire cases, in dealing with these problems, proceed upon the theory that the right of a mortgagee
to have his interest treated as real estate, extends to, and
ceases at the point, where it ceases to be necessary to enable him to protect and avail himself of his just rights, intended to be secured to him by the mortgage; that to enable him to sell and convey his estate, is not one of the
purposes for which his interest is to be treated as real estate;
that there is no necessity that it should be so treated for that
purpose. That can equally be effected in the usual way of
assigning and transferring the debt secured by the mortgage.' ° Yet, if the mortgagee has obtained possession " of
the mortgaged premises, it is recognized in this jurisdiction
that he acquires a sufficient interest in the land itself to enable him to transfer his possessory rights by a conveyance
of the land.' 2
In Connecticut 1" the view has been asserted that a conveyance by the mortgagee of real property, by way of mortgage, to a third person, and a subsequent delivery of the
personal security to such third person, may operate as an
10 Ellison v. Daniels, op. cit. supra note 8, at pp. 280, 281.
11 "He was then, if the notes had not been paid, a mortgagee in possession
by virtue of a process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. He had a
right to retain the possession as against the mortgagor, and this right might be
conveyed, so that his grantee would stand in his place, and would hold whatever right of possession was owned by his grantor." Per Gilchrist, J., in Smith
v. Smith, op. cit. supra note 8, at p. 66.
"...
a mere entry by the grantee of a mortgagee, before an entry by the
latter . . . is of no effect, and his deed will pass no interest." Per Gilchrist, J.,
in Weeks v. Eaton, 15 N. H. 145, 148 (1844).
12 The rule in Massachusetts, as to the effect at law of a conveyance by the
mortgagee, seems to be the same as that prevailing in Maine and New Hampshire. In Hunt v. Hunt, 31 Mass. 374, 379, 380 (1833), it was said: "A mortgagee,
especially after entry for foreclosure, is considered as having a legal estate, which
may be alienated and transferred by any of the established modes of conveyance,
subject only, until foreclosure, to be redeemed by the mortgagor."
13 Dudley v. Caldwell, 19 Conn. 218 (1848).
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assignment of the mortgage, and place the legal interest of
the mortgagee in the third person so as to enable him to
maintain an action of ejectment against the mortgagor. It
is said that an intent to assign the personal security may be
inferred from the conveyance of the mortgaged land.
In a comparatively recent Alabama case "4the court says
that a conveyance of the mortgaged land by the mortgagee
operates as a conveyance of the legal title and as an assignment in equity of the mortgage debt. This decision was in
equity in an action for an accounting and redemption. No
particular importance is to be attached to the fact that the
mortgagee is in possession at the time he conveys the premises, in transferring in equity the personal security, especially when the conveyance is made by a warranty deed. The
intention to transfer the personal security is the important
factor in such cases, and, as will be pointed out, that intention may appear from a transaction where there is no specific
transfer of the debt but only a transfer of the mortgaged
premises by the mortgagee. It would probably be easier to
show this intention from a conveyance by a warranty deed
in a "title" state than in a "lien" state, where the mortgagee
might be more apt to think he was transferring his entire interest in the mortgage relation. If the dictum in the Alabama
case is to be accepted, then a mortgagee is entitled to transfer the legal title to the mortgaged premises without the
necessity of having possession at the time of the conveyance. The court says that if the mortgagor is permitted to
remain in possession, his possession "would really be the
possession of the mortgagee." This result is in accord with
the view previously expressed in this paper that a possession in fact should not be considered as of any importance
where the mortgagee, in a "title" state, conveys the mortgaged premises to a third person and the controversy relates to the possession of the property at law.
14

Sadler v. Jefferson, 39 So. 380 (Ala. 1905).
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There is a dearth of authority in "lien" states dealing
with the effect, at law, of a purported conveyance or transfer of the mortgaged premises by the mortgagee, where the
mortgage relation is created by a common law conveyance
upon a condition subsequent. The reasonable and logical
rule that, it would seem, should prevail in these states is
stated in Kent's Commentaries "5 to be that "The assignment of the interest of the mortgagee in the land, without
an assignment of the debt, is considered to be without meaning or use. This is the general language of the courts of law,
as well as of the courts of equity; and the common sense of
parties, the spirit of the mortgage contract, and the reason
and policy of the thing, would seem to be with the doctrine."
There are a few New York decisions that should be noticed. In Hubbell v. Moulson 16 an action of ejectment was
brought by the grantees of the mortgagor against the grantees of the mortgagee. The plaintiffs offered to show, in support of their right to possession of the mortgaged premises,
that the mortgage debt had been paid by the receipt by the
mortgagee, while in possession of the land, of rents and
profits sufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt. The court
held that this evidence was properly excluded by the trial
court, on the theory that the receipt by a mortgagee in possession of rents and profits sufficient to satisfy the mortgage
debt does not ipso facto extinguish the lien of the mortgage
and that ejectment will not lie by a mortgagor against a
"mortgagee in possession." This case may be passed without discussion, as neither counsel nor the court questioned
the regularity of the possession, and it seems to have been
conceded that, by privity, the possession of the mortgagee,
however it was obtained, devolved upon the defendants. In
Jackson v. Bronson "7 the mortgagor sustained ejectment
against the grantee of the mortgagee, and the court said:
15
16

17

4 Kent's Comm. (14th ed.) 194.

53 N. Y. 225, 13 Am. Rep. 519 (1873).
19 Johns. 325 (1822).
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"It is now well settled that the mortgagee has a mere chattel interest, and the mortgagor is considered as the proprietor of the freehold. The mortgage is deemed a mere incident to the bond or personal
security for the debt, and the assignment of the interest of the mortgagee in the land, without an assignment of the debt, is considered

in law as a nullity."

Here, again, the regularity of the possession was not questioned by either the court or counsel; and this decision was
made before the Legislature of New York prohibited an action of ejectment by a mortgagee to obtain possession of the
premises mortgaged to him. Since the enactment of this
statute the law of New York appears to be that the legal
title to the mortgaged land remains in the mortgagor, as
against the mortgagee and assigns, until foreclosure. The
statute has deprived the mortgagee of the only legal method
by which he could acquire possession of the mortgaged premises without the mortgagor's consent, prior to foreclosure;
and the only way left by which he can lawfully acquire the
possession, prior to foreclosure, is by the mortgagor's consent. But, if the mortgagor consents to an entry, whether before or after default, by the mortgagee, the latter is entitled
to retain the possession until the mortgagor redeems or, at
least, offers to redeem.
As late as 1836, Chief Justice Savage of the Supreme
Court of New York argued that the mortgagee had an interest in the mortgaged premises, and that that interest after forfeiture was a legal interest,'---an interest sufficient
to protect him in the possession of the mortgaged premises
when obtained in fact. But the later view, expressed by
Commissioner Reynolds, in Trimm v. Marsh, 9 is the more
desirable view. He contended that the mere change of the
possession in fact of the real estate would not divest the
18 Phyfe v. Riley, 15 Wend. 248, 30 Am. Dec. 55 (1836).
In 1859 Denio, J., said: "Before the Revised Statutes, the mortgagee could
maintain ejectment after forfeiture; and now, if he gets into possession he may
defend himself upon the title conveyed by it [citing Phyfe v. Riley, and other
cases]." Mickles v. Townsend, 18 N. Y. 575, 584 (1859).
19 54 N. Y. 599 (1874).
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legal title of the owner, and that there was nothing in the
fact of actual possession by a mortgagee that would work
such a result. While the possession lawfully acquired by the
mortgagee of the mortgaged premises, in "lien" states is apparently attended with more incidents of legal ownership
than any other mere possession, it is still referable to the
security interest of the mortgagee. It should be considered
as giving an additional security interest to the mortgagee,
rather than as having any reference to a change of the legal
title. An instrument which confers no right to possession upon the mortgagee, either before or after default of the mortgagor, possesses little of the character of a conveyance, and
can hardly be deemed to pass any interest in the land, even
though the mortgage is made in the form of a common law
conveyance upon a condition subsequent. If the mortgagee
has acquired possession of the mortgaged premises, after
default and even with the consent of the mortgagor, his conveyance purporting to transfer the legal title should not,
in the "lien" states, be effectual for this purpose, and should
not be effectual for any purpose without a transfer of the
mortgage debt. The mortgagee holds, by virtue of the mortgage, only a lien upon the property, and that is a mere incident of the debt. However, as a mortgagee in possession he
should be entitled to transfer his temporary possessory right.
But his contract must purport to do this before it will be effectual to transfer such possessory right. If so, the transferee will be substituted to the mortgagee's position, subject
to the same rights and liabilities."
A diversity of opinion exists in the adjudged cases, mainly
in the "lien" states, as to the respective rights of the mortgagor and mortgagee, both before and after condition broken, arising from the different views taken of mortgages at
law and in equity, and the more or less extended application
20

(1863).

See discussion in Dutton v. Warschauer, 21 Cal. 609, 82 Am. Dec. 765
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of equitable doctrines to contracts of this description in
courts of law. The judges who had been trained in the rigorous school of the common law at first regarded the equitable theory of mortgages as an offensive innovation. But as
the equitable theory grew in favor courts of law began to
apply equitable principles, such as the right of the mortgagor to redeem after forfeiture. Despite this gradual and
partial evolution, the mortgagee was still regarded as in some
respects the legal owner of the mortgaged premises. He
could maintain ejectment, and assert other legal remedies,
subject only to the mortgagor's right of redemption. Finally,
in some jurisdictions, the rights of the mortgagee at law have
been so whittled down that the only strict legal right that he
has left is to collect the debt secured by his mortgage.
Many considerations connected with the mortgage relation operated to bring about this diversity of opinion as to
the respective rights of the mortgagor and mortgagee ai law
and in equity. Some of these factors are: (1) The fact that
the mortgage relation was ordinarily created by a common
law conveyance upon a condition subsequent; (2) Legislative abrogation of the mortgagee's right to enter by ejectment; (3) The question of whether repayment of the mortgage debt after default revested the legal estate in .the mortgagor without a reconveyance by the mortgagee; (4), Statutes restricting the mortgagee's rights to foreclosure; (5)
The question of whether a widow of a mortgagor, who has
died without redeeming the mortgaged premises, is entitled
to dower in the premises; (6) The question of whether the
mortgagee's interest in the mortgaged premises is subject
to execution; (7) The fact that the same court exercises
both law and equity jurisdiction; and (8) "Undertaking to
give effect in courts of law, under proceedings at common
law, to assignments and transfers by mortgagees which are
recognized as good in equity, though directly at variance
with the rules of law." 21
21

2 Washburn on Real Property, 5th ed., 512.
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In accordance with the rule that seems to prevail in the
"title" states, that a mortgagee out of possession cannot
effectually transfer his possessory rights by a mere conveyance of the mortgaged premises without being expressly
authorized 22 in the mortgage to do so, it is a logical deduction that a conveyance by a mortgagee out of possession is
not effectual for any other purpose at law; and such a conveyance would not operate to transfer the separate personal
security,23 whether the conveyance is made by a quitclaim
deed or by a warranty deed. On the other hand, if the mortgagee has obtained possession of the mortgaged premises
lawfully before he conveys them, the question arises as to
whether the mere transfer of the premises operates as an
assignment of the separate personal security. The dicta 24
in a few cases support the rule in the "title" states that if a
mortgagee, who has acquired possession of the mortgaged
premises, conveys them by a deed with covenants of general
warranty, the deed operates, as against the mortgagee-grantor, as an equitable assignment of the mortgagee's interest in
the personal security, if the latter is evidenced by a separate
instrument, in order to make the title as nearly peffect as can
be done by the warranty. The mortgagee-grantor would be
estopped,"5 under the warranty, from foreclosing, as against
See quotation from W. H. Glover Co. v. Smith, op. cit. supra note 6.
". . . our opinion is that a conveyance of the land does not transfer the
debt, because, so long as the mortgage is considered as an incident to the debt,
it cannot pass without a transfer of the principal." Per Gilchrist, J., in Smith v.
Smith, 15 N. H. 55, 65 (1844).
"It is well settled that when the mortgagee has negotiated the note secured
by the mortgage to a third person, without assigning the mortgage, he simply
holds the mortgage in trust for the holder of the note." Per Virgin, J., in Lord
v. Crowell, 75 Me. 399, 403 (1883).
24 Lawrence v. Stratton and others, 6 Cush. 163, 169, 170 (1850); Weeks v.
Eaton, 15 N. H. 145, 149 (1844); Welsh v. Phillips, 54 Ala. 309, 25 Am. Rep.
679 (1875).
25 "If the fee of John S. [the mortgagee] became perfect at law, freed from
the conditions annexed by the failure of the mortgagor to pay the debt, it would
have enured to his grantee, and he would have been estopped from setting it up
against him. A breach of the covenants of the conveyance [that the grantormortgagee was seized of an estate in fee simple] can be avoided only by treating
it, as it imports to be, a transfer of the grantor's interest in the lands, and of
22
23
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the grantee; a tender for the purpose of redemption, to be
valid, would have to be made to the grantee; 2 ' and a bill to

foreclose brought by a mortgagee who had conveyed by warranty after he had obtained possession of the mortgaged
premises, would be without equity as a bill for foreclosure, if
it showed these facts." If the mortgagee in possession conveys by a quitclaim deed, it would seem to follow that only
the incidental possessory rights would go to the grantee
thereunder. Such a conveyance would not estop the mortgagee-grantor from foreclosing, or entitle the grantee to call
for the personal security. The quitclaim grantee would have
to bargain expressly for the personal security in order to be
entitled to it. Otherwise, it seems that he would hold the bare
legal title for the benefit of the holder of the personal security, whether the latter be the mortgagee or an assignee of
the mortgagee, especially if the usual form of conveyance is
not by a quitclaim deed. But if no separate obligation is
given for payment of the mortgage debt, that is, if there is
no written evidence of the mortgage debt other than the
mortgage deed itself, it has been held in Maine that a quitclaim deed will pass all of the rights and interests of the
mortgagee in the mortgage and mortgaged premises to his
grantee; so that the conveyance will transfer the debt in
such a case, and a tender, to be proper, would have to be
made to the grantee,2" rather than the mortgagee-grantor.
all he had necessary to render the conveyance operative and effectual." Per Brickell, C. J., in Welsh v. Phillips, op. cit. supra note 24, at pp. 316, 683.
26 Wing v. Davis, 7 Greenl. 31 (1830) (Conveyance in fee by mortgagee,
who had entered for condition broken, to defendants. The court said: "We are
also of opinion that where a mortgage has been assigned, and the --ssignee has
entered and holds the title and possession, the tender for the purpose of redemption must be made to him. The language of our statute . . .is, 'upon payment or tendering of payment, & c.- to such mortgagee, vendee, or person
Such is the
claiming and holding under them and in possession as aforesaid,' ...
character and situation of the defendants.").
27 Hooper & Nolen v. Birchfield, 138 Ala. 423, 35 So. 351 (1903).
28 Dorkray v. Noble, 8 Me. 278, 284 (1832). ". . . if the mortgage had
been conditioned for the payment of a sum of money, no security having been
given for it other than the mortgage, perhaps a conveyance of the land would
transfer the debt." Per Gilchrist, J., in Weeks v. Eaton, op. cit. supra note 11.
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The rule that appears to prevail in both the "title" and
"lien" states is that whenever the mortgage relation is created by an absolute conveyance, a conveyance of the mortgaged land by the mortgagee operates to pass the mortgage
debt and the security of the land to the grantee.2 9 It seems
to be generally assumed that this rule exists, wherever a
case comes within its operation. If the grantee knows of the
mortgage relation existing between his grantor and the
debtor, he takes the land subject to the right of the debtormortgagor to redeem. If the grantee does not know of the
mortgage relation, he might become a bona fide purchaser
for value and so take the land free and clear of the mortgagor's right to redeem."0
29 Hawkins v. Elston, 58 Colo. 400, 146 Pac. 254 (1915) (Action by the heirs
of a grantor, under an absolute deed intended to operate as a mortgage, to have
the deed declared a mortgage and to be permitted to redeem from the mortgage;
the defendant was donee, under a quitclaim deed, of the grantee in the absolute
deed. The court held that the quitclaim deed operated as an assignment of the
mortgage indebtedness, investing in the quitclaim grantee the right to collect
the debt previously held by the grantee in the absolute deed.); Morrow v. Gorter, 217 S. W. 164 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (The grantee in a quitclaim deed intended as security quitclaimed the premises to his daughter; the court said that
the effect of the second quitclaim deed was to assign the security to the daughter
and that she was a necessary party to the action brought by the original grantormortgagor to redeem.) ; Hasley v. Martin, 22 Cal. 645 (1863) (Ejectment brought
by purchaser of land at an execution sale; the judgment debtor had conveyed
the land by an absolute deed, taking back a written defeasance; the grantee
conveyed the property, by absolute deed, to the defendant, but the latter conveyance was made after the plaintiff had attached the land. The court, in holding
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, said that the second conveyance operated to assign the mortgage, and that the grantee-assignee held the land subject
to the equity of redemption in the original grantor and those holding under him.
claiming under the attachment.).
30 As to whether continued possession of the premises, conveyed by an absolute deed intended to operate as a mortgage, by the grantor would operate
as constructive notice to a purchaser from the grantee-mortgagee, see a previous
part of this paper, 8 Notre Dame Law. 63, 64.
In Oklahoma statutes appear to have abridged the rights of innocent purchasers for value in such cases to the amount of the outlay with interest. The
following statutes are pertinent:
"Every instrument purporting to be an absolute or qualified conveyance of
real estate or any interest therein, but intended to be defeasible or as security
for the payment of money, shall be deemed a mortgage and must be recorded and
foreclosed as such." Comp. Laws of Okla. (1909) § 1196.
"Every instrument explanatory of any deed or other writing purporting to
be a conveyance, but intended to be defeasible or as security for the payment of
money, shall be deemed a part thereof, and must be filed and recorded therewith;
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When, for any reason, a sale of mortgaged real estate
under an attempted foreclosure, whether by suit in equity
or under a power of sale, is ineffectual to cut off the mortgagor's equity of redemption, the purchaser at such a sale,
if he is a third person, succeeds to the title and rights of
the mortgagee in the property, and may enforce them, to
the extent necessary to reimburse himself for the amount
he paid at the sale, if that amount does not exceed the
amount due on the mortgage, as the mortgagee could have
done had no sale taken place. Or if the mortgagee, or a
third person, purchases the mortgaged property at such a
sale and then conveys it, his deed, at least, operates as an
equitable assignment of the mortgage debt as well as the
mortgage title to the grantee. 1 The deed of the mortgagee,
and unless such instruments are so filed and recorded together, they and each
of them shall have no other effect than an unrecorded mortgage, and the recording of the principal instrument shall secure no rights to the holder thereof."
Comp. Laws of Okla. (1909) § 1197.
"Any person purchasing or taking any security against real estate in good
faith and without notice from one holding under an instrument purporting to
be a conveyance, but intended as security for the payment of money, and which
instrument has been duly recorded without any other instrument explanatory
thereof, shall be protected to the extent of the purchase price paid or actual
outlay occasioned with lawful interest, against all persons except those in actual
possession at the time of such purchase or outlay." Comp. Laws of Okla. (1909)
§ 1198.
"Any conveyance, other than as above provided, by one holding under an
instrument purporting to be a conveyance, but intended as security, shall be
deemed and treated as an assignment and transfer of the mortgage rights of
and indebtedness due the maker thereof." Comp. Laws of Okla. (1909) § 1199.
These statutes are considered to some extent in the foijiwing Oklahoma cases:
Krauss v. Potts, 135 Pac. 362 (Okla. 1913); Williams v. Purcell, 145 Pac. 1151
(Okla. 1914); Balduff v. Griswold, 60 Pac. 223 (Okla. 1900).
31 Robinson v. Ryan, 25 N. Y. 320 (1862) (Plaintiff, in foreclosure, had
purchased the mortgaged premises at an attempted foreclosure by the assignee
of the mortgagee, which sale was considered void. Held, inter alia, that the plaintiff thereby obtained all the interests of the assignee.); Lawrence v. Murphy, 45
Utah 572, 147 Pac. 903 (1915) (Held, that a conveyance of mortgaged property
by the mortgagee, who had foreclosed the mortgage and secured a sheriff's deed
to the premises, where the foreclosure proceedings are void, operates as an assignment of the real and personal security of the mortgage. The court said
that the assignee was entitled to foreclose the mortgage; and that the assignee,
who was in possession of the premises (apparently not with consent of the
owner of the equity of redemption), was a "mortgagee in possession" with all
rights incident thereto.); Lamprey v. Nudd, 29 N. H. 299 (1854) (Writ of
entry brought by the mortgagor. The first mortgagee had foreclosed, by writ
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even if it purports to convey only the legal title to the property, operates, in all jurisdictions, to vest in the grantee
named therein the title to the real security and the
personal security.2 Clearly there is an intent to pass a
of entry, and the writ of possession had been executed; the mortgagee then
conveyed to G., who conveyed to the defendant. In holding that the mortgagor
could not maintain his action while the judgment in favor of the mortgagee,
which was voidable and reversible on appeal, remained unreversed, the court
said that the deed of the mortgagee was sufficient to convey his mortgage interest, though it did not in terms purport to convey the mortgage debt.) ; Stark v.
Brown, 12 Wis. 572 (1860) (Ejectment to recover possession of mortgaged land.
The plaintiffs claim, one as one of the heirs, and both under the other heirs
of the deceased mortgagor. The defendant clafined under mesne conveyances from
the purchaser (one of the administrators of the assignee of the mortgage) at the
foreclosure sale, instituted after the death of the mortgagor and at which only
the administrator of the mortgagor was made a party. Held, that the defendant
had acquired the mortgage interest, and stood in the position of a mortgagee in
possession after condition broken (though apparently that possession was not obtained with the consent of the owners of the equity of redemption), and could
not be ousted by the ejectment. The court also held that, in such a situation, it
was not necessary that the deeds, through which the defendant claimed, should
have purported to have assigned the mortgage debt.) ; Cooper v. Harvey, 21 S. D.
471, 113 N. W. 717 (1907) (Void foreclosure sale under a power of sale, held to
operate as an assignment of the mortgage to the mortgagee, who purchased the
premises, and, through mesne conveyances from him, to the plaintiff in this
action to quiet title and recover possession.) ; Clark v. Wilson, 56 Miss. 753 (1879)
(Held, that the "purchaser of real estate at an invalid sale under a mortgage or
trust-deed, whose money has been paid, and applied to the satisfaction of the
mortgage-debt, is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee, so as
to fasten a lien on the land for the recovery of his money."). In Jordan v. Sayre,
10 So. 823, 827 (Fla. 1892), the court said: ". . . it has been held by many
cases, and seems to be sustained by the decided weight of authority, that where
a void sale has been made of the entire mortgaged premises under proceedings
to foreclose a mortgage, a third party purchasing at said sale succeeds to the
title and rights of the mortgagee in said property, and may enforce them as the
mortgagee could have done, had no sale taken place."
In Seller v. Lingerman, 24 Ind. 264 (1865), it was held, in an action instituted
by an execution defendant to set aside a sale of his land by the sheriff for irregularity, that the purchaser was entitled to recover the purchase money which
had been applied to pay the complainant's debt, and that the court possessed
the power to decree a lien for the same upon the land without the necessity of
the purchaser bringing a separate action to have the lien declared. The court
said that since the power to declare the lien existed in this action it would seem
to render a tender of the repayment of the sum, by the execution defendant, unnecessary.
32 In "lien" jurisdictions the rule is that a conveyance of the mortgaged
premises by the mortgagee before foreclosure, or at least an attempted foreclosure, unless such conveyance purports to transfer the mortgage debt, and
is intended by the parties to have this effect, will be inoperative for this purpose. The mere conveyance by the mortgagee of the mortgaged premises will not
per se operate as an assignment of the debt secured by the mortgage.
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greater interest. If that fails, there is no objection to the
operation of the instrument as an assignment. Valeat quantum valere potest.
The general doctrine is that a purchaser at a foreclosure
sale, or a grantee of the mortgagee who has purchased at
the foreclosure sale of his real security whether the foreclosure be by a suit in equity, or writ of entry, or a sale
under a power, will be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee, where the purchase money has been applied towards
a discharge of the mortgage, in the event that the sale is
ineffectual to extinguish the mortgagor's equity of redemption. In an Indiana case " it was said:
Subrogation generally takes place between co-creditors, where the
junior pays the debt due to the senior, to secure his own claim; or it
arises from the transactions of principals and sureties, and sometimes
between co-sureties or co-guarantors. It is not allowed to voluntary
purchasers or strangers, unless there is some peculiar equitable relation in the transaction, and, never to mere meddlers. But while this
is the rule generally, we think that a person who has paid a debt
under a colorable obligation to do so, that he may protect his own
claim, should be subrogated to the rights of the creditor ....
In the
case before us, doubtless James Muir [the purchaser of the land at a
public sale conducted by the mortgagee] supposed he was getting a
good title to the land by the deed from Holman [mortgagee], and
thus extinguishing the mortgage debt; and, although a voluntary purchaser, he is not a stranger to the transaction. We think, also, that
the property purchased being real estate, and the purchase-money
having been used 'in paying a creditor to whom the inheritance was
mortgaged,' the purchaser should subrogated to the rights of the or33 Muir v. Berkshire, 52 Ind. 149, 151, 152 (1875). Accord: Dutcher v.
Hobby, 86 Ga. 198, 22 Am. St. Rep. 444 (1890); Clark v. Wilson, 56 Miss. 753
(1879). In discussing this doctrine, the Supreme Court of Georgia said: "'Such
principle has the highest and most persuasive equity as well as common sense
and common justice for its foundation.' The cases cited . . . will be found ...
to apply to the doctrine of caveat emptor, which applies to sales upon valid
judgments, and is usually invoked with reference to sales upon executions issued
against the general property of the judgment debtor . . ." Dutcher v. Hobby,
supra.
Many courts will give a bona fide purchaser at an execution sale, who loses
his property by paramount title, a redress against the defendant in the execution for the amount paid on his purchase, which has gone to discharge the defendant's debts, by substituting him in the place of the creditor. See discussion in
Valle's Heirs v. Fleming's Heirs, 29 Mo. 152, 77 Am. Dec. 557 (1859).
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iginal creditor. . . . Although the deed -of Holman did not convey a
good title to James Muir, yet it conveyed all the interest Holman had
in the land at the time; and that interest was the right to foreclose
the mortgage against it and have the mortgage debt paid out of the
proceeds. We think, therefore, that the deed operated as an equitable
assignment of the mortgage to James Muir."

The doctrines of assignment and subrogation apply not
only in favor of a purchaser at an abortive foreclosure sale,
if he be a third person, and the purchaser from the mortgagee, if the latter purchases at the sale, but also in favor
of the grantees of such purchasers. 4
These principles of assignment and subrogation probably
should be rationalized upon equitable considerations prevailing between the mortgagee and the purchaser, whether
the latter be immediate or remote in the chain of conveyances dating from the invalid foreclosure sale. The right to
subrogation obviously does not depend upon a contractual
assignment of the mortgage debt, but it comes about by operation of law. There need not, and is not any intent, in
most, if not all, cases, as a matter of fact, to assign the mortgage debt where this doctrine of equitable subrogation exists as a matter of law. It may be said to be based upon
equitable estoppel where, for instance, the mortgagee has
purchased at the sale and has given a warranty deed to the
purchaser from him who seeks protection under the doctrine.
But, of course, this doctrine would not apply in favor of a
remote purchaser who has to rely upon a quitclaim deed.
As a practical matter, under what conditions and how is
the right to subrogation to be determined and applied? In
a North Carolina case 3 5 the doctrine of subrogation was
applied in an action to "try and determine the title to land,
or to remove a cloud from the title," brought by the owner
(in part) of the equity of redemption. A decision in the trial
34 Rogers v. Benton, 39 Minn. 39, 12 Am. St. Rep. 613 (1888); Jordan v.
Sayre, op. cit. supra note 31. See: Bruschke v. Wright, 166 Ill. 183, 57 Am. St.
Rep. 125 (1897); Lawrence v. Murphy, op. cit. supra note 31.
35 Ricks v. Brooks, 102 S. E. 207 (N. C. 1920).
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court that defendant was equitable assignee of the real
security and that the debt due by the plaintiff be ascertained, and that if it was not paid the plaintiff's interest in
the land be sold for its payment, was affirmed on appeal.
In a Minnesota case 31 an "action to remove cloud from
title" was brought by the purchasers claiming under mesne
conveyances from the purchaser at the abortive foreclosure
sale against the claimants of the equity of redemption. Possession of the premises had been surrendered to the purchaser at the sale, thus constituting him a "mortgagee in
possession." The right of action to redeem was barred by
lapse of time when the controversy over ownership of the
premises arose, so the plaintiffs were vested with "absolute
37
legal title" to the premises.
The purchaser, as assignee of the mortgage, would clearly
be entitled to foreclose the mortgage in order to protect himself against the consequences of the invalid foreclosure sale.
The sale would not prevent the owner of the equity of redemption from redeeming, and in an action to redeem the
assignee would be a necessary party. Also, payment of the
mortgage debt by the owner of the equity of redemption
should be made to the assignee."
In Givans v. Carroll " the operation of the principle of
subrogation was considered in detail. An action was brought
"for the possession of land and for rents and profits" by the
Rogers v. Benton, op. Cit. supra note 34.
37 "The plaintiff must recover [in an action to quiet title] solely upon the
strength of his own title and not upon the weakness of that of his adversary,
and so he should have a substantial and subsisting interest in the title to the
property. A party in possession having title, or one in adverse possession, and
under some statutes one having possession alone, provided that such possession
is actual, may maintain the suit. . . . A bill to remove a cloud can be maintained
by the holder of an equitable title; but in the absence of statute, legal title is
necessary to support a suit to quiet title. Statutes have quite generally extended
the right to quiet title to one who has the equitable title, and in some jurisdictions, but not in others, the holder of an equitable title may bring an action
against the holder of the legal title." 21 Standard Encyclopaedia of Procedure,
36

1001-1004.
38 See Robinson v. Ryan, 25 N. Y. 320 (1862).
30 18 S. E. 1030, 1032, 1033 (S. C. 1894).
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heirs of the mortgagor. The mortgage deed was executed to
secure a debt of $1,000. At a void foreclosure sale, the mortgagee, one Weathersbee, acting under a power of sale, sold
the mortgaged property to one Bist for $700. Subsequently,
Bist died and his heirs at law united in an action of partition, under which the mortgaged tract of land was sold and
conveyed to the defendant, one Carroll, at the price of
$1,025. After holding that Carroll was subrogated to the
rights of the mortgagee under the real security, the court
gives us the following discussion of the rights and equities
of the parties:
"The second exception seems well taken. Its language is: 'Because
his honor erred in holding that -the plaintiffs were not entitled to interest on the rents of said land as the same accrued, whereas it is
submitted that his honor should have held, that the rents should have
been applied in the accounting annually to the satisfaction and discharge of the mortgage ,. .' We do not mean to sustain the exception

in the form in which it is presented. The underlying idea embodied in
the exception amounts to this: If A. is indebted -to B. by an obligation bearing interest, and B., at the same time such indebtedness subists, is indebted to A. for sums of money that accrue and become payable at the beginning of each year, when an account is taken in chancery of such mutual indebtedness, if the sums of money due by B. to
A. exceed the interest due on the contract of A. to B., this excess
should be applied to the extinguishment of interest, and thereafter to
the principal, as far as it will do so. Take this as an illustration of
our views: If A. owes B. a debt of $700, evidenced by a note wherein
interest is fixed at 7 per cent, at the end of the first year A. owes B.
on such debt, $749. But suppose, when the debt is contracted, B. is
in the possession of land belonging to A., whose rental value is $50
for that first year, and for any cause this mutual indebtedness is
carried into chancery; will not A. be held to have his debt due B., of
$749, reduced by the $50 due by B. to A. for rent? Would not the
same principle be applied if the debt had run at interest for several
years, on the one hand, and the indebtedness for rent had run on for
a corresponding period? This would -be so, not because the rent bears
interest, (the payment of interest is a matter of contract,) but because
in equity such mutual indebtedness, accruing and maturing at stated
intervals, is subject to such a rule. Now in the case at bar, on the 1st
day of January, 1880, the heirs at law owed, so far as the assets of
their ancestor descended to them would pay, to Carroll, the defendant,
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the sum of $700 at 7 per cent. interest, and therefore this indebtedness
on the 1st January, 1881, amounted to $749. But, on the other band,
Carroll, owed these heirs, on the 1st January, 1881, the sum of $50
for the rent of their lands. The true amount of this indebtedness on
the 1st January, 1881, was the $749, less the rent of $50, to wit, $699.
This last amount of $699, with interest, amounted on the 1st January,
1882, to $747.93, but Carroll owed the heirs rent on that day, $50.
The true amount due by plaintiffs to Carroll on the 1st January, 1882,
was $697.93. Plaintiffs owed Carroll, on the 1st January, 1883,
$746.79, less $50 for rent,-really, $696.79. Plaintiffs owed Carroll,
on the 1st January, 1884, $745.57, less $50 for rent,-really, $695.57.
Continuing this process . . . down to the 1st January, 1892, the
plaintiffs will owe, as the balance of the mortgage debt at that date,
$382.55. But at that date the plaintiffs also owed Carroll $173.35 for
improvements and taxes. The whole indebtedness at that date would
be $555.90, and this sum, with interest to the 1st January, 1893, would
amount to $594.81. Applying the rent for 1893 at $90 per annum
would leave the lands in the heirs' hands liable to pay Carroll $504.81.
The decree in the circuit court should provide that if the heirs at law
of Lard (the plaintiffs) do pay to the defendant the sum of $504.81,
and the costs of this action, by a day certain, to be named in the
decree, the lands should be turned over to the plaintiffs with any rents
for the year 1894, 'but that, in the event of their failure to pay these
sums, then the lands in question should be sold, and the proceeds-of
the sale applied to costs and the debt of Carroll, and thereafter such
proceeds as remain be paid to the plaintiffs."

In holding that Carroll could only enforce the mortgage to
the extent of $700, the amount paid by Bist at the "illegal
sale," the court said:
"When Bist paid Weathersbee $700 he thought he was purchasing
the land in question at that price as its value. Such price so paid was
not an extinguishment of the debt due Weathersbee by Lard, but only
such a portion of the debt as was secured by the land pledged to
secure the debt. Equity would only subrogate Bist to such a proportion of the debt as was secured by the mortgage. The sale ascertained
the portion of the debt so secured by the mortgage ... it is Weathersbee's contract with Bist which connects Carroll with this mortgage,
and in that view $700 was the portion of the debt, as secured by this
mortgage, that was assigned by operation of law, by Weathersbee to
Bist, and through Bist's heirs to Carroll. . . .we are called upon to
enforce an equity growing out of a contract, and for which equity the
parties themselves made no direct provision. Under such circumstances
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it seems to us that such equity should be confined and made operative within the limits of the transaction of the parties to it."

If the principles of this case are reasonable and just, and
they appear to be, there is a definite limitation on the extent
to which the doctrine of subrogation is applied. It seems
that this limitation should apply in any case, regardless of
who purchases the property at the invalid sale and whether
it is conveyed thereafter, with or without a warranty.
Where the mortgagee or a third person purchases the
mortgaged property at an invalid foreclosure sale, and obtains possession thereof, the question has frequently been
before the courts in the "lien" states as to whether the
owner of the equity of redemption is entitled to maintain
ejectment against him. Or, to put the question another way,
does such purchaser thereby become a mortgagee in possession, and thus can defend against the owner of the equity
of redemption, or his representative, any action, except one
for an accounting of the rents and profits and to redeem? 0
This problem includes within its scope the purchaser through
mesne conveyances from the mortgagee or third person who
has purchased at the invalid sale. Also, it would not seem
to make any difference in the result as to whether the premises were sold at a judicial sale or under a power of sale
contained in the mortgage.
If the purchaser at the invalid foreclosure sale who obtains
possession of the mortgaged premises, whether he be the
mortgagee or a third person, becomes a mortgagee in possession, he is entitled to defend against an action of eject40 This problem cannot be of any importance in "title" states where the
mortgagee may and does make an entry to foreclose, but the foreclosure is ineffectual, and retains the possession until he conveys the premises. Such were
the facts in Ruggles v. Barton, 13 Gray 506 (1859), where the mortgagee, after
he had attempted to foreclose by an entry, conveyed by warranty to the plaintiff. The foreclosure was invalid because the mortgagee omitted to have a certificate thereof recorded. The plaintiff brought this action, a writ of entry, to foreclose. There was no assignment of the personal security other than the warranty
deed. During the trial the mortgagee transferred the notes secured by the mort-

gage to the plaintiff, in order to give effect to his warranty deed. The court held

that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment of foreclosure.
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ment brought by the owner of the equity of redemption, or
his representative. So the question arises as to when the
purchaser at such a sale becomes a mortgagee in possession.
In New York the rule prevailing now is that the mortgagor
can not be deprived of his possession, except by a valid
foreclosure sale or by his own consent, express or implied. 4
41 Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, 84 N. E. 75, 16 L. R. A. (NS) 151
(1908); Herrmann v. Cabinet Land Co., 217 N. Y. 526, 112 N. E. 476 (1916).
"The question whether a mortgagee who has obtained possession without wrong
may retain possession until the mortgage debt be paid is allied, historically and
analytically, with his right to take possession." Campbell, Cases on Mortgages,
21, footnote 1. "In that case [Madison Ave. Bap. Ch. v. Oliver St. Bap. Ch., 73
N. Y. 82 (1878)], as in Townshend v. Thompson [139 N. E. 152, 34 N. E. 891
(1893)] . . .the element of the mortgagor's consent seems to have been regarded
as the controlling factor. If the foregoing decisions have been correctly analyzed,
it is obvious that notwithstanding misleading dicta and inaccurate syllabi the
cases have quite consistently held to the rule that the mortgagee's entry must be
lawful to enable him to defend the mortgagor's action of ejectment, and the last
two cases cited (139 N. Y. 152, 34 N. E. 891, and 73 N. Y. 82), as well ns
Howell v. Leavitt, 95 N. Y. 617, are plainly authorities for the proposition that
such entry cannot be lawful, prior to foreclosure, without the mortgagor's consent.
That this consent need not be express, but may arise by implication from circumstances, was decided in Gross v. Welwood, 90 N. Y. 638, where it was held
to be a question of fact for the jury." Per Werner, J., in Barson v. Mulligan,
op. cit. supra note 41.
In a Minnesota case, Rogers v. Benton, op. cit. supra note 34, the court said:
"The law as to what constitutes a 'mortgagee in possession' has not been so clearly
defined by the decisions as it might be. Sometimes the subject is referred to as
if all that is necessary is that the mortgagee should be in possession in fact,
regardless of the mode of acquiring it. Sometimes a 'mortgagee in possession' is
spoken of as one who has acquired possession 'peaceably,' or again, 'lawfully.'
At common law a mortgage conveyed the legal title, defeasible upon payment
of the mortgage, and upon breach of the condition the mortgagee became at
once entitled to the possession of the mortgaged premises, and having this right,
could maintain an action of ejectment. But this has been changed by statute
which provides that a mortgage of real property is not to be deemed a conveyance, so as to enable the mortgagee to recover possession without foreclosure:
Gen. Stats. 1878, c. 75, sec. 29. It was difficult for the courts at first to free
themselves from their old ideas of the nature of a mortgage, or to realize the
full extent of the change wrought by this statute. . . . They seemed to think that
the mortgagee, after condition broken, still had the right of possession, but that
the statute merely forbade its legal enforcement. Hence, if he could somehow get
possession, he could maintain it on common law principles. Any such doctrine
is utterly inconsistent with all legal principles. If a 'mortgagee in possession' can
insist on maintaining it, his right must depend upon his contract, and must be
capable of enforcement. . . . The legislature, by the statute referred to, doubtless intended to sweep away every remaining vestige of the ancient common-law
rule, which regarded a mortgage as a conveyance of the title, and to make it
a mere chattel,-a lien; the fee and right of possession remaining in 'the mortgagor both before and after condition broken: Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343;
78 Am. Dec. 145. . . . It follows . . . that a mortgagee, even after condition
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This rule is based upon an early statute denying the mortgagee an action of ejectment, and the progress of judicial
decision after the passage of this statute. Yet the old rule
that existed in this state, founded upon the "title" theory
of mortgages, kept its hold somewhat upon the later New
York opinions when the reason which led to it was gone.
This inconsistency in the progress of the judicial decisions
in New York has had a marked effect upon the judicial
development of the law upon this question in other states
that have enacted statutes substantially the same as the
early New York statute and have followed the New York
opinions. In some of the New York cases, that have upheld
the right of the mortgagee, who has purchased at an invalid
foreclosure sale, to defend an action of ejectment brought
by the owner of the equity of redemption, the mode of acquiring possession does not distinctly appear,4 2 and in some
the rule is stated quite broadly and with little of restriction
or limitation.4 3
broken, has no right or remedy except to foreclose his mortgage; that he cannot,
merely under his mortgage, either recover or maintain possession of the mortgaged
premises. The only logical rule is that, to constitute 'a mortgagee in possession,'
the mortgagee must be in possession by reason of the agreement or assent of
the mortgagor, or his assigns, that he have the possession under the mortgage
and because of it....
Having no right to take possession under his mortgage,
the mortgagee can get none, except by the agreement or assent of the one who
owns that right. This, of course, need not necessarily be express. It may be implied from circumstances. Where the mortgagor expressly abandons possession,
his assent that the mortgagee might go into possession under his mortgage might
well be implied, especially when he allows him to remain in possession for a
considerable length of time without objection."
42 "The theory upon which these cases [Robinson v. Ryan, 25 N. Y. 320
(1862); Smith v. Hitchcock, 130 Mass. 570 (1881); Jackson v. Bowen, 7 Cow. 13
(1827)] seem to have been decided was that the foreclosure proceedings, though
void, were equivalent to an entry upon the mortgaged property for breach of
the conditions of the mortgage. Except upon this theory, it is impossible to
harmonize these cases with others in the same courts, of which no mention is
made in the opinions." Per Hoyt, C. J., in Smithson Land Co. v. Brautigan, 47
Pac. 434 (Wash. 1896).
43 "The case of Van Duyne v. Thayre, 14 Wend. 233, is one of the most
generally cited authorities for the broad proposition that a mortgagee who
obtains possession of the mortgaged premises after forfeiture may defend his
possession in ejectment until his mortgage is paid. The headnote is quite as comprehensive as the foregoing statement; but the opinion of Mr. Justice Nelson
very carefully limits the rule to a possession obtained, 'either by consent of the
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Where the owner of the equity of redemption is not made
a party to the suit to foreclose the real security and the
judgment against him is enforced by a writ of assistance
which puts the mortgagee, who has purchased at the foreclosure sale, in possession, clearly the mortgagee is not
entitled to defend an ejectment action brought by the owner
of the equity of redemption.4 4 The mortgagee can not be
mortgagor, or by legal proceedings.' . . . In Hubbell v. Sibley, 50 N. Y. 469,
the action was for an accounting to ascertain the amount due on certain mortgages, in which the validity of a deed in foreclosure was the underlying question.
Judge Grover stated that since the enactment of the statute ["No action of
ejectment shall hereafter be maintained by a mortgagee, or his assigns or representatives, for the recovery of the possession of the mortgaged premises."] 'a
mortgagee in possession can defend his possession in ejectment brought by the
mortgagor.' This was not only obiter, but it is true as far as it goes. In Winslow
v. McCall, 32 Barb. 241, which was an action upon covenants of warranty and
quiet enjoyment, the case turned upon the regularity of proceedings to foreclose a mortgage by advertisement. One Cornwall was in possession under a deed,
and also held a junior mortgage, which was not cut off by the foreclosure. Referring to this junior mortgage, the court said that when it became due 'Cornwall was in possession - a possession legally acquired, and of which he had
never been legally divested.' This statement requires no comment. If the mortgagee's possession was legally acquired, he could, of course, defend it until his
debt was paid. In Bolton v. Brewster, 32 Barb. 389, the plaintiffs claimed as
heirs at law. The defendant was the tenant of one who claimed, in the first
instance, under an executor's deed, the validity of which was challenged for lack
of jurisdiction in the Surrogate's Court in proceedings for the probate of a will.
But the defendant's landlord also held a mortgage which, to use the language
of the court, was 'a subsisting lien upon the lands claimed, and is held for the
purpose of assuring and protecting the title.' In that case, as in other early cases,
it seems to have been assumed that the mortgagee was lawfully in possession without stating the facts upon which the conclusion was founded. The case of Hubbel v. Moulson, 53 N. Y. 226, 13 Am. Rep. 519, may be passed without discussion.
Although that was an action of ejectment by a mortgagor against one who stood
in the shoes of the mortgagee, neither court nor counsel questioned the regularity
of possession, and it seems to have been conceded that by privity his possession
had devolved upon the defendants." Per Werner, J., in Barson v. Mulligan, 84
N. E. 75, 79, 80 (N. Y. 1908).
In Maine it has recently been held that where the owner of the equity of redemption is not made a party to the foreclosure proceedings, and the owner of
the mortgage has not obtained possession of the mortgaged premises, but has
conveyed them at the foreclosure sale without purporting to assign the personal
security, the former can maintain an action to recover possession of the prenises.
W. H. Glover Co. v. Smith, 138 At. 770 (Me. 1927). This principle is another
application of the general rule in this state that a conveyance by a mortgagee,
who has not lawfully obtained possession of the mortgaged premises, transfers no
legal title to the premises, unless the personal security has also been assigned to
the purchaser.
44 "In that case [Howell v. Leavitt, 95 N. Y. 617 (1884)] the owners of
the equity of redemption were not made parties to a suit in foreclosure, and the
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said to have obtained possession of the premises with the
consent of the owner of the equity of redemption when the
latter is bound to comply with the writ of assistance. Neither
can it be said that by yielding up possession of the mortgaged premises sold under the judgment at the invalid foreclosure sale, without awaiting the issuance of the writ, the
owner of the equity of redemption has waived any of his
rights." Where the owner of the equity of redemption
brings ejectment against the purchaser at the invalid foreclosure sale, to which the owner of the equity of redemption
has not been made a party by service of process, the New
York Court of Appeals argues that it would be unjust to
say that his only remedy against the purchaser is an action
for an accounting and for permission to redeem the premises; and that if such were the law, the mortgagee in most
cases would only have to await a time when the mortgaged
premises were temporarily unoccupied and enter peacefully
thereon, and the mortgagor would then be limited to an action to redeem with all the burden of attack and of proof
resting upon him." On the other hand, if the mortgaged
premises are apparently abandoned when the mortgagee
obtains possession of them, or if the mortgagee obtains posjudgment against them was enforced by a writ of assistance which put the mortgagee in possession. The court held that the possession of the mortgagee was without lawful authority and amounted to a trespass." Per Cuddeback, J., in Herrmann v. Cabinet Land Co., 217 N. Y. 526, 112 N. E. 476 (1916). The action in
Howell v. Leavitt was ejectment.
45 Herrmann v. Cabinet Land Co., op. cit. supra note 44. This case was an
action of ejectment, brought by the owners of the equity of redemption who were
not made parties to the action to foreclose a mortgage.
In a recent Oklahoma case the mortgagee purchased the mortgaged premises
at a foreclosure sale, to which the owner of the equity of redemption had not
been made a party, and then brought an action "to clear his title" to the premises,
making the mortgagor and his grantee, the latter having purchased the property
after the execution of the mortgage but before foreclosure, parties. The court
said that the mortgagee "was simply a mortgagee in possession," and his possession
could not be disturbed as long as the mortgage debt remained unpaid. It did not
appear as to whether the mortgagee had obtained the possession without awaiting
the issuance of a writ of assistance or whether the owner of the equity of redemption had assented to the taking of possession by the mortgagee. Page v. Turk,
43 Okl. 667, 143 Pac. 1047 (1914).
46 Herrmann v. Cabinet Land Co., op. cit. supra note 44.
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session peaceably, and to the knowledge of the mortgagor,
and the latter makes no objection for a reasonable period of
time, the mortgage- should be considered a "mortgagee in
possession" in Nc:w York or any other state that has enacted
a statute abrogating the right of the mortgagee to take possession of, or to maintain ejectment for, the mortgaged
premises. 7 The Minnesota cases, in considering the scope
of operation of a statute similar to that of New York concerning the right of the mortgagee to obtain possession of
the mortgaged premises, have adopted the same view as
that prevailing in New York.4 8
Under a statute providing that "A mortgage of real estate
shall not be deemed a conveyance, so as to enable the owner of the mortgage to recover possession of the real property without a foreclosure and sale according to law," the
Supreme Court of Oregon has taken the view that if the
mortgagee "obtains possession without force, he is entitled
as well since as before the statute to hold it against the
mortgagor," " relying upon the earlier New York cases as
supporting this principle; whereas, as has just been pointed
out, in those cases, when properly analyzed, the element of
the mortgagor's consent seems to have been regarded as the
controlling factor in creating the position of a "mortgagee
in possession." In Cook v. Cooper 5o the mortgagee foreclosed, purchased the property and went into possession
of the premises. The defendant, in an action wherein it became necessary to consider his liability for removal of certain chattels placed upon the premises, while he was in possession as purchaser through mesne conveyances and in
reliance upon an apparently valid title, was considered a
"mortgagee in possession." The heir at law of the deceased
See discussion in Rogers v. Benton, set forth in footnote 41.
See Rogers v. Benton, op. cit. supra note 34, and cases cited therein.
49 Cook v. Cooper, 18 Or. 142, 22 Pac. 945, 7 L. R. A. 273, 17 Am. St. Rep.
709 (1889).
50 Op. cit. supra note 49.
47
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mortgagor had not been made a party to the foreclosure
proceedings. The mortgagee and his grantees had apparently
obtained possession of the premises without the aid of a
writ of assistance but without the consent of the owner of
the equity of redemption. The court adopted the view "that
while a mortgagee is not permitted to maintain a possessory
action to recover the mortgaged premises by reason of the
default of the mortgagor, still, if he can make a peaceable
entry upon the mortgaged premises after condition broken,
he may do so, and may maintain such possession against
the mortgagor and every person claiming under him subsequent to the mortgage, subject to be defeated only by the
payment of his debt," arguing that "this view ... in no manner interferes with the just rights of the mortgagor, and
at the same time it does not sacrifice the interest of the
mortgagee to the merest technicalities of the law, which
have sometimes been permitted to prevail, and the mortgagee turned out of possession stripped both of the property and his mortgage debt as well." True, the mortgagee or
other purchaser of the property at the invalid foreclosure
sale would not be subjected to the expenses of another action in order to protect his rights as assignee of the mortgage, under this view, but it is going too far to say that his
rights would be sacrificed to the "merest technicalities" if
he is turned out of possession in an ejectment proceeding,
for either is entitled to foreclose the mortgage. If an equitable defense may be made to the action at law to recover
possession of the mortgaged premises, it seems that the owner of the equity of redemption should not be entitled to
maintain his action of ejectment until he at least tenders the
amount due on the mortgage debt, if the mortgagee is the
purchaser at the invalid foreclosure sale, or until he tenders
the amount paid, or, in some jurisdictions, bid by a third
person at such sale. It appears to be assumed that the mortgagee has the right to be considered a "mortgagee in pos-
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session" merely because he obtains the possession somehow after condition broken, if he does so without actual
force. There is no merit, as to the mortgagee's interest in
possession of the premises, in emphasing the point of time
in a "lien" state. If the statute has changed the substantive
rights of the parties to a mortgage, and the better view is
that the legislature so intended in passing such a statute,
the mortgagee who has obtained possession of the premises
mortgaged to him can defend the mortgagor's possessory
action if, and only if, he has obtained that possession with
the express or implied consent of the mortgagor, or as purchaser at a valid foreclosure sale. It seems that the New
York Court of Appeals has sufficiently answered any contention to the contrary. And when the Oregon court refers to
"merest technicalities," the question arises as to what is
meant -rules
of courts of equity, or of courts of law, or
both? The Oregon court relied upon the New York cases;
but the position of the court of last resort in the latter state
is now clear and is definitely to the contrary of that reached
by Cook v. Cooper. It seems that the Oregon view sacrifices
substance to form. Another view, as to the procedural aspects of the question, is that presented in a Mississippi
case, " ' wherein the court said:
"Where the extent of the right of the defendant in ejectment is to
fix an equitable charge on the property, or, in other words, where the
plaintiff has both the legal title and a beneficial interest in the land,
the defendant must submit to a judgment in ejectment and seek the
intervention of the court in chancery to enjoin its execution until satis-

faction is made of his equitable charge."
In a South Carolina case 5 where the question was whether the heirs of the mortgagor were entitled to recover the
possession of certain land from the defendants who claimed
under a continuous chain of title from one who had entered
upon the land, under a deed made in execution of adefective
51
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Bonner v. Lessley, 61 Miss. 392 (1883).
Sims v. Steadman, 40 S. E. 677 (S.C. 1902).
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and invalid power of sale contained in the real security, in
good faith and in the honest belief that he was clothed with
the legal title at the time of such entry, the court held that
these facts were a valid defense to the action at law, saying
that equity would postpone the plaintiff's right to recover
possession until he "does equity by paying the amount due
on the mortgage," and that equity would remit the plaintiff
to his equitable right of redemption. The purchaser's right
of subrogation was considered as giving him an equitable
charge upon the mortgaged property, which could be
set up as a bar to the action at law brought to recover
possession of the premises. This view allows the settlement
of the right to redeem and the right to foreclose in one action, even though it be an action to recover possession of
the premises sold at the invalid foreclosure sale. Where an
equitable defense may be relied upon as a bar to an action
at law the South Carolina view should prevail.
Where, however, the owner of the equity of redemption
seeks equitable relief, as by bringing a suit to set aside
an invalid foreclosure sale, the maxim that he who seeks
equity must do equity applies; and, before he can secure
such aid, he must at least offer to refund the amount paid
at the invalid foreclosure sale, which has been used to discharge the mortgage indebtedness.5 3
Tiffany, in his work on "Real Property," gives a very
concise statement of the law in the "lien" states. He says:
"In states in which the mortgagee has not the title to the land, a
conveyance in terms only of the land or of his interest in the land is
obviously nugatory as such, and such a conveyance has ordinarily been

regarded as not operating to transfer the debt with its accompanying
security, occasionally subject to a qualification to the effect that such

is the case in the absence of evidence of an intention to transfer the
debt, and subject also to an exception, it seems, in case the mortgage

is in the form of an absolute conveyance. But though the cases do
not ordinarily discuss the effect of such a conveyance by the mort-

gagee from that point of view, it would seem that, in most cases, the
53 Bruschke v. Wright, op. cit. supra note 34.
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question is whether, when the conveyance is construed in the light of
the surrounding circumstances, it shows an intention to transfer the
debt secured. 54 That, in the particular jurisdiction, the mortgagee has
or has not the title may affect the construction in -this regard, but it
seems questionable whether, even in those states which adopt the 'lien'
theory of a mortgage, it should be assumed as an absolute rule of
law that a conveyance in terms of -the mortgagee's rights in the land
cannot operate as a transfer of the debt." 55

It has been observed in a previous part of this paper
that a conveyance of the mortgaged premises by the mortgagee who has purchased the property at an invalid foreclosure sale and has obtained possession of the premises
with the express or implied consent of the mortgagor operates to assign the real and the personal security to the
grantee. In this situation it is not necessary that the language of the conveyance by the mortgagee manifest an intent to assign the real and the personal security. The assignment takes place by operation of law; whereas, Tiffany is
dealing with contractual assignments. Again, as between the
54

The following cases support this proposition: Noble v. Watkins, 87 Pac.

771, 772 (Or. 1906); Jordan v. Sayre, 10 So. 823, 827 (Fla. 1892); Swan v.
Yaple, 35 Iowa 248 (1872); Watson v. Hawkins, 60 Mo. 550 (1876); Peters v.
Jamestown Bridge Co., 5 Cal. 334, 63 Am. Dec. 134 (1855); Hawley v. Levee,
123 N. Y. S. 4, 66 Misc. Rep. 280 (1910).
The following cases support the proposition that a conveyance by a mortgagee out of possession operates as an assignment of the mortgage held by such
mortgagee: Gottlieb v. City of New York, 128 App. Div. 148, 112 N. Y. S.
545 (1908) (overruled in Hawley v. Levee, supra); Maginn v. Cashin, 162 N.
W. 1009 (Mich. 1917).
55 Tiffany, Real Property, Vol. III, p. 2533.
"... where, as in this state, a mortgage on real property does not convey
an interest in the lands, but constitutes only a lien or incumbrance thereon . . .
it is clear that an instrument executed by the mortgagee which purports to convey to a stranger the mortgaged property cannot operate as an assignment of the
mortgage as against third persons [in this case the grantee of the mortgagee was
claiming as against the prior assignee of the nortgagel, unless the language of
the conveyance is such as to manifest an intention to that end." Noble v. Watkins,
op. cit. supra note 54 at p. 772.
"It is . . . true, under the existing conditions with us in respect to the rights
of mortgagor and mortgagee, that a conveyance by the latter of the mortgaged
property before foreclosure, or an attempted foreclosure, unless such conveyance
contain a grant of the mortgage debt, or unless its terms are sufficient to carry this
interest, and it was intended by the parties to have this effect, will be inoperative
for this purpose. The mere conveyance by the mortgagee of the mortgaged
premises alone will not per se operate as an assignment of the debt secured by
the mortgage." Jordan v. Sayre, op. cit. supra note 54, at p. 827.
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grantee of the mortgagee and the mortgagee, the grantee
of the mortgaged premises may be entitled to the real and
the personal security, though he has not expressly bargained
for them, as where the premises have been conveyed to him
by a warranty deed. This latter should be true in any jurisdiction.
In an early Minnesota case 56 the court said:
"The mortgagee has no conveyable interest in the mortgaged
premises until foreclosure sale, or at least until entry after condition
broken, 57 and a conveyance of the premises by the mortgagee to a
third party, unless, at least, intended to operate as an assignment of
the mortgage and transfer of the mortgage debt, is entirely inoperative,
and such intention must be made to appear."

In the "lien" states a mortgage deed is not regarded, as a
general rule, as a conveyance vesting in the mortgagee any
estate in the land, either before or after condition broken.
If the mortgage is made in the form of a conveyance upon
a condition subsequent, it is difficult to understand how it
can operate as a conveyance after condition broken if it
does not operate as a conveyance before that time. The
only difference is that in the one case the estate conveyed is
conditional, and in the other, absolute. But where the mortgagee has obtained possession of the mortgaged premises,
with either the express or implied consent of the mortgagor,
and relying upon his mortgage to do so, he obtains at least
a temporary possessory right, whether he goes into possession before or after default of the mortgagor. And it seems
that this possessory right is transferable where the mortgagee has purported to transfer it. It would seem that, if
the mortgagee has no right to take possession of the mortgaged premises because his mortgage deed does not operate
56

Hill v. Edwards, 11 Minn. 22 (1865).
Even in Ohio, a state that has been said to subscribe to the "intermediate"
theory of mortgages, it was said, in Hill v. West, 8 Ohio 222, 31 Am. Dec. 442
(1837): "A mortgagee has not, even after the condition of defeasance has been
broken, such an interest in the mortgaged premises, that he can convey by release
or other mode of conveyance, until the equity of redemption is foreclosed, unless
he, at the same time, transfers the debt secured by the mortgage."
57
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as a conveyance of the premises, there must be an intent
manifested to transfer the possessory right before it will pass
to the grantee of the premises. So the mortgagee's interest
in the mortgaged premises is in some cases regarded as a
legal title, not for the purposes of enabling him to transfer
the legal title by a transfer of the premises alone, but for
the purpose of protecting and enforcing the equities between
the parties to the mortgage. The transferee of the possessory
right of the mortgagee would be subject to the same liabilities and would have the same rights as the mortgagee who
has lawfully obtained the possession before foreclosure in
the "lien" states.
Transfer of the "mortgage," i. e., the real security.Where a mortgage is executed in the form of a conveyance
upon a condition subsequent which purports to secure the
debt which is evidenced by a separate instrument two important questions have arisen: Is the mortgage, that is, the
real security, assignable? And, if it is assignable, how may it
be assigned? This type of mortgage is the one that seems to
have produced the most litigation in the law of assignments
of mortgages, mainly because of attempts to separate the
real and the personal securities and to pass them to different
transferees.
It has been said "' that "A mortgage, being considered in
the light of a transaction purely personal, was deemed to be
nonassignable at law; but this view has generally, although
not invariably, given way to statutes, or to the modem doctrine as to the assignability of choses in action generally.
Equity, however, has always recognized the assignability
of mortgages." And, in discussing the question of the effect
of the assignment of the real security without an assignment
of the secured indebtedness, the following principle has been
stated:
58

41 C.

J. 661,

Title "Mortgages."
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"It is the general rule that a mortgage cannot pass without a transfer of the debt to secure which it was given, and therefore an attempted
assignment of the mortgage without any assignment or transfer of the
secured indebtedness is usually considered an absohte nullity; for the
indebtedness is not considered as passing by a bare transfer of the
mortgage unless there is something more to show an intention to pass
the indebtedness also.: 9

In Olds v. Cummings ' 0 the court discussed the scope of
operation of the Illinois statute making certain "choses in
action" assignable:
"By the common law, choses in action were not assignable. For the
convenience of commerce, by the statute of Anne, in England, certain
choses in action were made assignable, so as to vest in the assignee
the legal title, as promissory notes and bills of exchange. We have a
statute, also, making certain choses in action assignable, prescribing
a particular mode in which they shall be assigned. Our statute provides
that any promissory note, bond, bill, or other instrument in writing,
whereby one person promises to pay another any sum of money, or
article of personal property, or sum of money in personal property,
shall be assignable by indorsement thereon. Now, the mortgage to
foreclose which this bill was filed, was given to secure the payment of
two promissory notes which were assigned by the payee and mortgagee
to the complainants. This was, in equity, an assignment of the mortgage. The notes were assignable by the statute, but the mortgage
is not, nor was it assignable by the common law. The assignee
of a mortgage has no remedy upon it by law, except it -be treated as
an absolute conveyance, and the mortgagee convey the premises to the
assignee by deed; and upon the question whether this can be done, the
authorities are conflicting. Even our statute, authorizing foreclosures
of mortgages by scire facias, has carefully confined the right to the
mortgagee, and does not authorize this to be done by assignees. But
it is said that the assignment of the notes carries with it the mortgage,
which is but an incident to the principal debt. That is true, in equity,
and only in equity."

If, as the Illinois court says, the real security, i. e., the mortgage, is not assignable at the common law or under the Illi59 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 1033, 1034, Title "Mortgages."
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31 Ill. 188, 190, 191 (1863).

For a case involving the same type of ques-

tion, a similar statute, and reaching the same result in practically the same language, see Longan v. Carpenter, 1 Colo. 205 (1870) (Decided by the Supreme
Court of Colorado Territory), rev., on appeal, in 16 Wall. 271, 21 L. Ed. 313
(1872).
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nois statute, it is obvious that a purported assignment of
the real security by the mortgagee can not operate to give
the "assignee" any standing in a court of law to foreclose
the mortgage. The provision of the Illinois statute on scire
facias as a method of foreclosure reinforces this conclusion.
The "assignee" is not entitled to proceed at law and sue out
a scire facias to foreclose the mortgage; his remedy is purely equitable. But in a later case,61 the Illinois Court said that
the estate and interest of the mortgagee might be conveyed
to a third person, by a deed with apt words of conveyance;
and that the grantee, if owner of the personal security, might
maintain ejectment in his own name and for his own use.
Or the action might be brought in his name for the use of
a third party owning the personal security. According to
the latter principle, the "assignee" of a mortgage has no
remedy upon it at law, except it be treated as an absolute
conveyance and the mortgagee convey the premises by an
instrument executed with the formalities of an ordinary conveyance of land. If, according to this principle, the "assignee" may maintain ejectment, he can thereby subject
the mortgaged premises indirectly to the payment of the
mortgage debt at law, whereas he could not directly maintain an action at law to do so by foreclosing the mortgage.
In the one case, the mortgage is treated as a conveyance; in
the other, as a "chose in action."
The statute of Anne "2made promissory notes payable to
a person, and to his order, or bearer, negotiable like inland
bills, according to the custom of merchants. The Illinois
statute was to the like effect. The actual decision in Olds v.
Cummings is that a mortgage is not assignable at law as
commercial paper, although given to secure negotiable paper; and that where the bona fide assignee of commercial
paper so secured seeks relief in equity by the foreclosure of
61
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Barrett v. Hinkley, 14 N. E. 863 (Il. 1888).
3 and 4 Anne, c. 9 (1704).
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the mortgage, the mortgagor may successfully interpose any
defense which would have been available against the original payee or holder of the paper. The court said that the
notes, to secure which the mortgage was given, were still
negotiable paper; and when the remedy is sought upon them
all the rights incident to commercial paper would be enforced in the courts of law.
In Jackson v. Curtis,6" an early decision by the Supreme
Court of New York, where the "lien" theory of mortgages
was applied, it was said that "the assignment of the interest
of the mortgagee in the land, without an assignment of the
debt, is considered in law as a nullity." The Supreme Court
of Missouri, misinterpreting this statement, has said:6 4
"The doctrine is asserted in the books that the assignment of a
mortgage is regarded as a nullity ....

This, however, must be intended

of cases in which the mortgage alone is assigned, and in which it was
the intention of the parties that nothing but the mortgage, disconnected from the debt whose payment was secured by it, should pass.
It cannot be applied to cases in which although an assignment of the
mortgage is in terms made, yet it is clear from the transaction, that
-the debt was likewise designed to be transferred. No form of words is
exclusively appropriated to create an assignment of a debt. The contract of assignment is to be construed like all other contracts, and as
in them, the intention of the parties must prevail, so in this."

It is one problem to consider the effect of a transfer by
the mortgagee of the mortgaged land - an assignment of
the interest of the mortgagee in the land - and quite another thing to consider the effect of a purported transfer of
the real security - an assignment of the mortgage - when
questions at law, as distinguished from questions in equity,
are involved. The distinctions between the views prevailing
in the "lien" and the "title" states has been pointed out.
Also, the principle that a "mortgagee in possession" is entitled, in "lien" states, to transfer his possessory interest has
been considered.
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The doctrine asserted by the Missouri court, that an assignment of the mortgage alone may evidence an intention
to assign the personal security; and, if so, the assignment
would probably be given effect in equity, as between the assignee and the mortgagor, in all jurisdictions. It seems to
be a sound principle. On the other hand, the doctrine that
is supported by most courts,65 that have considered the prob65 "The assignment of the mortgage deed, without a transfer of the debt,
conveys nothing. And so of an absolute conveyance of the land by a separate
deed before entry." Per Parker, C. J., in Rigney v. Lovejoy, 13 N. H. 247, 251
(1842); Thayer v. Campbell, op. cit. supra note 64; "In concluding that a mortgagee cannot assign the right to the mortgaged property, without also assigning
the debt to which it is an incident, we do not desire to be understood as "ntimating that it is incompetent for the mortgagee to relinquish, by contract, the
possession to a third person, at any time, until the debt is paid. But the defendant does not claim to occupy under such a contract-he insists upon the
validity of the assignment to himself." Per Collier, C. J., in Doe v. McLoskey,
1 Ala. 708, 737 (1840) ; "It would e quite absurd to say that . . .the holder of
the evidence of a debt, who is also the holder of collateral securities, could separate or divide the obligation in such a manner as to subject the debtor to two
prosecutions for the same debt. This would manifestly be the case if he could
assign any rights in such securities, for in such case the holder of the securities
could prosecute thereon, and the holder of the principal evidence of indebtedness
could also prosecute. It is plain, therefore, that without the assignment of the
debt, which is but the evidence thereof, the assignment of the securities confers no
rights." Per Bird, V. C., in Johnson v. Clark, 28 Atl. 558, 559 (N. 3. Ch. 1894);
"..... the contenfion that a mortgagee can convey the property in disconnection
with the debt is . . .a novel one in this state. Such a doctrine would very materially alter the ancient and present practice of searching the public records with
respect to the title to real estate. Heretofore no person, in making such an investigation, has deemed it requisite or advisable to look for conveyances made by
mortgagees. No clerk has ever certified as to them. No lawyer, in all probability,
in the management of foreclosure, has ever thought of the possibility of 'he
existence of such a conveyance. . . . It would clearly conflict with the spirit if
not the letter, of the act regulating the recording of the assignments of mortgages.
Revision, p. 708, § 34. The effect of that provision is to enable mortgagors to
obtain a cancellation of their mortgages, by payment or release, without danger
so far as unrecorded assignments are concerned; and for that purpose it requires
all assignments of mortgages to be recorded in the appropriate book in the
public office." Per Beasley, 0C. 3., in Devlin v. Collier, 22 Atl. 201, 203 (N. 3.
1891); "It is a well-settled rule that collaterals cannot be separated from the
principal debt; and it has been distinctly held by the Court of Appeals in the case
of Merrick v. Bartholick, 36 N. Y. 44, that the transfer of a mortgage without
the transfer of the debt is a nullity.... If such were not the fact, we would have
the obligor of a bond, and the mortgagor in a mortgage to secure the payment of
this bond, obligated to two persons to pay the same debt." Per Van Brunt,
P. J., in Bean v. Carleton, 4 N. Y. S. 60, 61 (1889); ". . . tho allegation that
the said mortgage has been duly assigned . . . must, as against a demurrer, be
held sufficient; for there can be no effectual assignment of the mortgage that does
not pass the debt it is given to secure. An attempt to assign the mortgage sev-
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lem, is that an assignment of the real security alone, where
there is no manifestation of an intention to assign the personal security and where the assignment may be made at
law or in equity and is in proper form, does not operate as
an assignment of the personal security either at law or in
equity.
Necessity of a Formal, Written Assignment to Transfer
the Real Security.-There is a conflict of judicial opinion
in "title" states as to "whether a mortgage of real estate is
to be regarded as a security and not as a conveyance within
the statute of frauds, and therefore assignable at law without any instrument in writing by delivery only." 66 In Massachusetts and Maine the rule that has been adopted is that
the transferee of the real and personal security is not entitled to maintain an action at law, as a writ of entry, upon
the real security unless it is assigned by a writing under the
statute of frauds.67 But an assignment of the real security
ered from the debt would be wholly inoperative." Per Gilfillan, C. J., in Foster
v. Trowbridge, 40 N. W. 255 (Minn. 1888). "Where a promissory note is secured
by a mortgage, the note, not the mortgage, represents the debt. The mortgage
is, therefore a mere incident, and an assignment of such incident will not, in law,
carry with it a transfer of the debt." Per Spear, J., in Kernohan v. Manns, 41
N. E. 258, 260 (Ohio 1895).
Contra: "A mortgage consists partly of the estate in the land, partly of the
debt. So far as it conveys the estate, the assignment is absolute and complete
the moment it is made according to the forms of law ....
But it is difficult to say,
the mortgage passes, and is well assigned to one person, and yet the debt remains
in another. It is impossible that it can be so divided. Therefore by the assignment of the mortgage the debt necessarily passes, as an incident to it . . ." Per
Sir W. Grant, M. R., in Twisden v. Twisden, 9 Ves. Jun. 407, 409, 411 (1804);
"Her [the mortgagee's] assignment of the mortgage was necessary to pass the
legal title to the property; and its equitable effect, if the consideration had been
paid according to its terms, would have been to vest in Lowekamp, the assignee,
the debt or note it was intended to secure." Per Stewart, J., in Tubman v. Lowekamp, 43 Md. 318, 322 (1875).
These excerpts are given to show the juridical doctrine as to the effect of an
assignment of the real security alone.
66 Lyford v. Ross, 33 Me. 197, 198 (1851).
67 Lyford v. Ross, op. cit. supra note 66. (In this case the court said: "The
decisions of this State have followed those of Massachusetts, and the question
might be considered at rest here without reference to any statute provisions. . ..
Mortgages in this State may be foreclosed without any judicial proceedings by
acts in pais; and if they were not regarded as within the statute of frauds, titles
to real estate could be transferred without operation of law or any deed of con-
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made by a separate deed, without delivery over of the original mortgage deed, would be sufficient, under this view, to
pass the legal interest of the mortgagee in the security to
the assignee.6 A written assignment indorsed on the mortgage deed, is not sufficient to enable the transferee to maintain an action at law on the mortgage, as a writ of entry. 9
In New Hampshire it has been held 70 that "the interest of
the mortgagee passes in all cases with the debt, and that it
is not within the statute of frauds, because it is a mere
incident to the debt, has no value independent of the debt,
and cannot be separated from the debt." The New Hampshire court has reasoned further: (1) That the mortgagee
has no interest in the mortgaged property for the purpose of
transferring it,-- the mortgagee being treated as owner of
the mortgaged land only for the purpose of enabling him to
obtain the full benefit of the security; (2) That the mortgagor is owner of the mortgaged land, for on no other
ground could the widow of the mortgagor be entitled to
dower; and (3) That the right of the mortgagee in the mortgaged land is extinguished, ipso facto, under the New Hampshire statute, by payment, or tender of payment, even after
condition broken. The doctrine that is supported by the
New Hampshire cases isthat the assignment of a mortgage
is valid at law without being acknowledged, recorded, or
veyance. The registry with the records of the courts would no longer afford information, in which confidence could be placed, respecting titles. Nor would
mortgagors or their grantees be able to ascertain with certainty to whom performance should be made or tendered to redeem their estates." The statute, subsequently considered by the court, provided that "'no estate or interest in lands
shall be granted, assigned or surrendered, unless by some writing signed as aforesaid, or by operation of law.'"). Accord: Warden v. Adams, 15 Mass. 233 (1818).
68 Warden v. Adams, op. ct. supra note 67, at p. 236.
69 Adams v. Parker, 78 Mass. 53 (1858).
It has been held in Massachusetts that the deed of assignment need not contain words of inheritance to pass a fee simple title. Barnes v. Boardman, 149
Mass. 106, 113, 308 N. E. 308, 309' (1889). Cf. the Indiana statute providing
that the words "mortgage and warrant" operate to convey a fee simple interest
to the mortgagee. Burns' Anno. Ind. Stats. (1926) § 13389. If such is the effect
in the mortgage itself, a fortiori when such expression is used in an assignment.
70 Southerin v. Mendum, 5 N. H. 420 (1831) (Writ of entry to recover
possession of the mortgaged premises brought by the assignee of the mortgage.)
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attested, and may be made by parol upon an assignment of
the personal security, so as to enable the assignee, by a
writ of entry, to assert his claim to the land in his own
name.7 A fortiori this rule would be applicable in equity.
According to the rule adopted by the courts of Maine and
Massachusetts, it may happen that the legal title to mortgaged property may be vested in one person, as, for instance,
the mortgagee, while another person may have the legal
title to the personal security. Suppose a mortgage deed is
made to secure a single promissory note and the note is
properly transferred by the mortgagee to a third person and
the mortgage deed is delivered to the latter without any
written assignment sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
the statute of frauds. While the assignment is not sufficient
to transfer the legal title, it would be sufficient to transfer
the beneficial interest to the assignee, so as to enable him
to maintain a suit in equity to have the legal interest transferred, on the theory that the law will imply an intention
of the parties that the legal title is held by the mortgagee in
trust for the assignee; or the assignee should be entitled to
subject, in equity, the real security to the satisfaction of
the mortgage debt. The same result would seem to follow
where the real security has not been assigned at all, if there
is nothing to show an intention of the parties that the real
security was not to be assigned. On the other hand, if a
mortgage is given to secure two or more promissory notes,
and the mortgagee transfers one of them to a third person,
without the expression of any intent, either to retain the
mortgage as security for the remaining note or notes, to
the security of which alone it may be adequate, or to hold
the mortgage for the benefit of the transferee of the remaining note or notes, the question arises as to whether the transferee of the first note is entitled to any benefit from the real
71 See Salvage v. Haydock, 44 N. H. 696 (N. H. 1896); Page v. Pierce,
26 N. H. 317 (1853).
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security.72 This problem will be considered at length in a
subsequent part of this paper.
In Illinois. an assignment of the real security must be in
the form of a writing under seal in order to operate as a
transfer of the legal interest of the mortgagee in the real
security.7" But a deed of assignment is not necessary in
equity to transfer the interest of the mortgagee in the mortgaged premises.74 In New Jersey an assignment of the real
security must be by a deed of assignment to be effectual at
law ; but, in equity, the real security is regarded as a chose
in action, and, as such, assignable by mere delivery, and
without a writing.7" In Missouri the rule seems to be that
the real security passes at law with a transfer of the personal
security, as an incident to the latter, without the necessity
of any formal written transfer. 77 But sound business practice
requires that the real security be assigned by a written indorsement, at the very least. An analogy might well be taken
from the law of negotiable instruments. And the policy of the
laws providing for the recording of assignments of mortgage deeds requires this formality.
In "lien" states 78 it seems that a deed of assignment is
not necessary to transfer the legal title to the real security,
See discussion in Young v. Miller, 72 Mass. 152, 154- (1856).
Barrett v. Hinkley, 124 Ill.
32, 14 N. E. 863, 7 Am. St. Rep. 331 (1888).
74 Mallory v. Mallory, 86 Ill.
App. 193 (1899) (Indorsement of the following
held sufficient in equity: "Transferred to Wm. Skakel, June 21, 1895. Wm.
Riley.").
75 Den v. Dimon, 5 Hals. 156 (N. J. Law 1828).
76 Denton v. Cole, 30 N. J. Eq. 244 (1878); Galway v. Fullerton, 17 N. J.
Eq. 389, 394 (1866).
77 Mayes v. Robinson, 93 Mo. 114, 5 S. W. 611 (1887); Borgess Inv. Co. v.
Vette, 142 Mo. 560, 44 S. W. 754 (1897). '
78 In Fryer v. Rockefeller, 63 N. Y. 268, 276 (1875), the court said: ".
there is no legal need of a recording of the assignment, nor any for an assignment
in writing. A good assignment of a mortgage is made by delivery only." In Runyan v. Mersereau, 11 Johns. 534, 6 Am. Dec. 393 (1814), the owner of the equity
of redemption brought an action of trespass quare clausum fregit. The premises
had been mortgaged to one M., under whom the defendant had entered and cut
timber. In giving judgment for the plaintiff, the court said: "Mortgages are not
considered as conveyances of land within the statute of frauds. . . . The assignment of the debt, or the forgiving it even by parol, draws the land after it as a
consequence."
72

73
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and, of course, it would not be necessary to transfer the
equitable title. There is but very little authority on the
former principle, which is obviously due to the fact that
most controversies involving the rights of the assignees of
mortgages have arisen in equity. According to the "lien"
theory of real estate mortgages, the personal security is the
principal part of the mortgage contract, and the real security is merely an incident. The real security is given to enable
the owner of the personal security to realize the debt. This
view prevails both at law and in equity in the "lien" states.
While the real security should follow the personal security,
at law or in equity, in these jurisdictions, where the personal
security is properly transferred, it seems desirable that there
should be a written assignment. In Minnesota it has been
said 11 that a mortgage on real estate, "though it is, in effect,
but a lien or security . . . is, in form, a conveyance of an

estate or interest in land, and is so treated and regarded in"
the Minnesota statutes; and "as such estate or interest, it
must, at law, be created and assigned by deed." This necessity is said 1o to be further apparent from the statute requiring that to entitle a party to foreclose by advertisement,
the mortgage and the assignment, if it shall have been assigned, shall be recorded; and neither the mortgage nor the
assignment thereof is authorized to be recorded under the
Morrison v. Mendenhall, 18 Minn. 232 (1872).
Morrison v. Mendenhall, op. cit. supra note 79.
"The equitable doctrine above referred to, that a transfer of the debt involves
a transfer of the mortgage security, has been applied even when the transferee
was at the time ignorant of the existence of the mortgage. A contrary view would
involve either a separation of the debt and of the security, which would appear
. . . to be impossible on principle, or an extinguishment of the security by reason
of such ignorance, which would appear to be unjust and unreasonable." Tiffany,
Real Property (2d ed.) 2524. This view seems to be a just one. The mortgage
was given with the intention on the part of the mortgagor that it should secure
the payment of the mortgage debt; and it would seem to make no difference to
the mortgagor as to whether the mortgagee or the transferee of the debt uses
the real security for this purpose. No harm can come to the mortgagor if a court
of equity passes the real security to the transferee. Also, it is in accord with the
principle that the assignor impliedly, at least, promises that he will do nothing to
impair the value of the assignment.
70
8O

PRIORITIES IN THE LAW OF MORTGAGES

Minnesota statute, except it be under seal and duly acknowledged. According to the Minnesota doctrine, where a
mortgagee transfers the note, secured by his mortgage, to a
third person, but does not transfer the real security by a
deed of assignment, the third person is "equitable" owner
of the real security, but the mortgagee retains the "legal"
title to the real security. While the "assignee," under the
Minnesota rule, who has not obtained a deed of assignment
of the real security, is the "equitable" owner of the real
security, he would not be entitled to foreclose the same
by advertisement; yet he should be entitled, in equity to
compel the mortgagee to transfer it to him. It would seem
that this principle should apply although the "assignee"
did not bargain for the real security and was, at the time of
the transfer of the personal security, ignorant of the existence of the real security. This result is in accord with the
fundamental principle in the law of assignment of contracts
that the assignor agrees that he will do nothing to defeat or
impair the value of the assignment.8 1 On the other hand,
the Minnesota rule has been stated to be 82 that the mortgagor is entitled to pay the mortgage debt to the mortgagee,
whether the mortgage has been assigned or not, if he pays
in good faith and without knowledge of the assignment; and
even if the real security has been assigned properly and
recorded, the recording is not notice to the mortgagor of
the assignment. While the lien of the real security may be
extinguished in this manner, it is also a part of this doctrine that the mortgagee becomes a trustee of the sum paid
for the benefit of the owner of the mortgage debt. If, for
instance, the mortgage contained a power of sale, and the
mortgagee transferred the personal security to a third person but did not properly assign the real security to such
person, the mortgagee would be the proper person to exer81
82

Restatement of the Law of Contracts, § 175.
Johnson v. Carpenter, 7 Minn. 176 (1862).
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cise the power of sale since he retains the legal title to the
real security;" 8 but, in executing the power of sale, the mortgagee would be subject to the "equitable" control of the
court as to the manner of its execution and the disposition
of the proceeds of the sale. So the "assignee" could ultimately reach the proceeds realized upon the real security. Regardless of these principles, the "assignee" could bring an
action at law upon the personal security and, under a judgment lien, subject the mortgagor's land to payment of the
debt, assuming, of course, that there are no adverse claimants who are entitled to priority of right to the real property or the real security.
W. D. Rollison.
University of Notre Dame, College of Law.
(To be continued.)

83 See Burke v. Backus, 53 N. W. 458 (Minn. 1892).
An assignment on the back of a mortgage stating that "For value received I
hereby transfer the within mortgage deed to J. L. Kennedy" was held by the
Supreme Court of Georgia not to authorize the transferee to exercise the power
of sale contained in the security deed. McCook v. Kennedy, 90 S. E. 713 (Ga.
1916).

